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Decolonizing the Cosmopolitan Geospatial Imaginary of 
the Anthropocene: 
Beyond Collapsed and Exclusionary Politics of Climate Change  
Shelby E. Ward 
Abstract: This paper extends Tariq Jazeel’s argument on cosmopolitanism to the Anthropocene. 
Jazeel argues that cosmopolitanism should be thought of geospatially, as a geographic analysis 
reveals that cosmopolitanism cannot escape its own historically Western spatial imaginary, 
ultimately collapsing difference and universalizing humanity (77). In reaction against suggestions 
that cosmopolitanism is a more ethical and socially responsible approach to changing 
environments, I maintain instead that the Anthropocene already operates within a cosmopolitan 
geospatial imaginary, which not only collapses blame and responsibility in the face of global 
environmental crises but also silences and erases the historical contexts of exploitation and 
extraction that follow within north-south lines of coloniality. Therefore, a decolonization of the 
cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene requires, in order to situate continued 
coloniality in environmental geopolitics and international relations, looking at the frameworks of 
both the nation-state and cosmopolitanism. The sections follow a critique of this proposed 
dialectic working within systems of exclusionary politics of the nation-state and the collapsing 
politics of cosmopolitanism. 
 
Peter Marden has suggested that rising tensions between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism are not as dialectically opposed as they might seemingly 
appear, but are both implicated within forces of globalization (37). I contend with 
Marden that these two conditions are actually much more intimately connected, 
but I also suggest that the rise of globalization as an “emergent” force, as Marden 
indicates, needs to be understood within imperial and colonial contexts – as 
globalization is connected to historical articulations of coloniality (Dalby 104; 
Doty 6; Epstein 3; Jabri 38). Perhaps it is no surprise that over the past two 
decades cosmopolitanism has been linked to another issue associated with 
globalization: climate change (Delanty and Mota 26-27). As Gerard Delanty and 
Aurea Mota state: 
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This cosmopolitan sensibility accords with the deliberative understanding of 
democracy. Moreover, it affirms the centrality of agency and an ethic of care 
and responsibility. For all these reasons, the political challenge of the 
Anthropocene is very much one that can be cast in the terms of cosmopolitics. 
(37) 
However, it is the very humanity that cosmopolitanism produces that is the 
concern of this paper. I contend that both nationalism and cosmopolitanism are 
historically situated within a Western, imperial consciousness, including a 
Western, geopolitical imagination. This paper, therefore, investigates the ways in 
which these imaginations may limit our responses to changes within our 
environments.   
         Dipesh Chakrabarty states that two forces, perhaps more than any others, 
define our contemporary condition, both as individuals and collective citizens: 
“globalization and global warming” (1). Chakrabarty acknowledges that 
globalization has contributed to changes in our environments, as well as to the 
historical development of international relations of coloniality, which has also 
allowed forces of globalization to unfold in the ways that they have, including 
capitalist development and exploitation. I suggest that postcolonial theory is a 
productive perspective from which to analyze the intimate connections between 
globalization; the nation-state; cosmopolitanism; and the age now defined by 
the influence of humans on the planet, the Anthropocene.   
         On the Anthropocene, Chakrabarty also suggests that postcolonial thought 
may provide an appropriate and adequate understanding of the contradictory 
notion of the “human” to be utilized effectively in discussions of environmental 
changes. This stands in critique of the scientific literature that constitutes 
humans as “one” – that is, “a species, a collectivity whose commitment to fossil-
fuel based, energy-consuming civilization is now a threat to civilization itself” 
(2). The collapse of differences in the scientific language of climate change, 
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particularly in the definitions associated with the Anthropocene, I argue, parallels 
Tariq Jazeel’s critique of cosmopolitanism. Jazeel suggests that cosmopolitanism 
is no geographically innocent signifier, and to think of it geographically or 
geospatially indicates the ways in which any 
attempts to pluralize our understandings of cosmopolitanism ultimately serve 
to reinstantiate the liberalism, rationalities and taxonomies of thought that 
are tethered to the concept’s irredeemably European and universalizing set of 
values and human normativities. In other words, cosmopolitanism’s 
pluralization does little to open a Eurocentric critical intellectual imagination 
up to differences not proscribed by a centre that sets the parameters for 
difference. (77) 
Therefore, following his suggestions, I look at the ways in which political 
imaginaries that respond to how we can live together may benefit greatly from 
“stepping out from cosmopolitanism’s long conceptual shadow” (77). 
         Associated with scientists such as Paul J. Crutzen, the Anthropocene is the 
newly suggested geological time period following the Holocene that is defined by 
the changes and influences of the human on the planet (Caluya 32; Chakrabarty 
9; Luke, “On” 152). But as Chakrabarty also points out, the influence and 
significance that was once held only for geophysical forces is now given to 
humans; therefore, given Chakrabarty’s and Jazeel’s respective critiques on the 
collapse of a singular, collective human identity within climate change discourse 
and cosmopolitanism, it should be asked: who is the “we” in these collapsed 
imaginaries and how do we understand human agency, both as a collapsed 
signifier and as a geophysical force? In other words, this is a question of how we 
understand both the relations between “nature” and the “human,” and as Gilbert 
Caluya points out, “how we deal with nature is often a reflection of how we deal 
with humans and is thus reflective of human politics” (35). 
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         As connections are made between globalization (in the intersections and 
histories of industrial, economic, and political developments) and climate change, 
the histories and continuities of coloniality and Western productions of 
knowledge, including the status of the nation-state, cosmopolitanism, 
international relations, and conceptions of the environment and nature, ought to 
be reconsidered within a project of decolonization. There are, of course, many 
potential and important interventions in which to take on a decolonization of 
international relations, but this paper is specifically concerned with 
conceptualizations of global climate change, including discursive productions of 
the Anthropocene, and how we conceptualize and imagine the human within it. 
In reaction against arguments that claim cosmopolitanism, or even cosmopolitics, 
as a more ethical and appropriate response to anthropogenic climate change 
(Alcaraz et. al 315; Haraway 12; Larsen & Johnson 5), I argue that the 
Anthropocene already follows a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary, extending 
Jazeel’s argument to question how we might re-imagine the politics of 
togetherness and responsibilities. I suggest that this geospatial logic of collapse, 
uniformity, and universalization – an objective “view from nowhere” – is 
operationalized in the conceptualization of the Anthropocene as a Western logic 
system that collapses blame and erases the histories of imperialism and 
industrialization. These exploitative regimes have contributed to massive 
environmental change, and continue to do so, putting to trial and distributing 
the resultant impacts across a universal humanity. 
         Moreover, following the historical Western developments of both 
cosmopolitanism and the nation-state, decolonizing the Anthropocene would 
change how we respond to climate crises internationally and, subsequently, 
would require a decolonization of the nation-state itself. Therefore, in the 
following sections, I first consider the geospatial imaginary of the nation-state 
following Chantal Mouffe’s argument that Western liberal democracies are 
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historically developed within exclusionary politics and suggest that we can see 
how exclusionary politics are articulated and employed towards climate change 
after the 2016 U.S. election of Donald Trump as president (106). To be sure, the 
inclusion of this specific example of American politics does not indicate that 
national politics is now exclusionary, but that the nation-state itself is always- 
already based on exclusionary politics, including in the mapping and historical 
spatial and strategic partitioning of the nation-state through systems of silences 
and utterances (Harley 57). Second, I consider the spatial imaginary of 
cosmopolitanism, which situates itself beyond the limited and exclusionary scope 
of the nation-state. Discussions of both spatial imaginaries are necessary for a 
decolonization of the Anthropocene and the nation-state because these are 
dialectical, not mutually exclusive, positions. 
         Both the Anthropocene and the nation-state highlight postcolonial 
critiques of capitalism, including the collapse and invasion of nature that is 
already operative in the global economy. Therefore, extending Jacques Derrida’s 
suggestion that cosmopolitics is about hospitality and the stranger, “[w]hether it 
be the foreigner in general, the immigrant, the exiled, the deported, the stateless 
or the displaced person (the task being as much to distinguish prudently between 
these categories as is possible),” it follows that we also extend discussions of 
strangeness not only as potential sites of alternative knowledge production, but 
that we also consider the strange worlds that are produced within various 
conceptualizations of nature (4). This includes also making strange “the 
environment” as it is discussed now within a global political economy: 
cosmopolitics is also cosmo-economics. Moreover, as I will indicate, Derrida’s 
discussion of cosmopolitics, as opposed to even Donna Haraway’s use of it, is 
meant as a critique of the contradictory concept of cosmopolitanism, which ends 
up paralyzing political action (Critchely & Kearney x). 
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         Seemingly, then, the geospatial imaginary of the nation-state produces 
exclusionary identity politics that limit the imagined response-ability towards 
strangers and strange worlds affected by anthropogenic climate change, while 
the geospatial imaginary of cosmopolitanism collapses the potential for 
differences in the ways in which we might conceptualize, respond to, know, and 
produce our worlds. Clearly neither collapsing nor exclusionary politics is effective 
or appropriate for dealing with the vast social, political, economic changes, 
disparities, and differences that continue to arise alongside changing 
environments, landscapes, and habitats. However, even as the paper is structured 
vis-à-vis the geographic imaginaries of the nation-state and cosmopolitanism 
regarding climate issues and the Anthropocene, and alongside them, notions of 
exclusionary and collapsing politics, I contend that these sections should be read 
as ongoing articulations and oscillations between collapse and exclusion, or even 
as silence and utterances. That is to say, first, the nation-state is only capable of 
producing exclusionary identity politics and spatial formations, as it already 
marks an idealized collapse of territory, polity, identity, and language. Such 
continuity in the production of the Western state is not natural but historically 
contingent within Western geographic and political thought; it has been criticized 
by Sankaran Krishna as producing “cartographic anxiety” within historically, non-
Western, and radically plural cultures. Particularly following the era of sweeping 
postcolonial independence, there have been violent results within those 
territories taking up the project of Western state building and development (508; 
see also Ahmed 5). As part of this project, I suggest we can also look at how such 
cartographic anxiety is not only a part of “post” colonial societies but is integral 
within the project of Western nation building more generally, as seen in the 
following examples of America’s recent anxious rhetoric of “America First” in 
responses to climate change. Second, in discussions of the Anthropocene and 
cosmopolitanism, I suggest that Jazeel’s use of Donna Haraway and the “view 
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from nowhere” – “the god trick, this eye fucks the world to make techno-
monsters” – reveals the illusion of this collapsing of difference and blame. This 
particular geographic view simultaneously excludes potential alternative 
geospatial imaginaries, works in favour of a Western economic politicization of 
“the environment,” instead of multiple environments, and, ultimately, erases 
alternative ways of relating to the planet (581). In order to account for the 
continued imperial, masculine, and objective knowledge produced on the 
environment and nature, this paper also emphasizes indigenous and subaltern 
conceptualizations of environments, natures, and the interconnected systems of 
the human and non-human worlds. 
         The consideration of these oscillating systems should also include the 
global north’s industrial history of exploiting resources from the global south (or 
Third World, colonial, and “developing” states), the former profiteering while 
continuing to effect vast changes upon environments. Indeed, the environment 
itself is now discussed as a geopolitical resource, which only contributes to the 
ongoing history of geopolitics and resource-grabbing instead of producing 
alternative formations and conceivable responses to such means (Vogler 6; 
Williams 53; Dalby 110; Mallinson and Ristić xiv). As such, decolonizing the 
cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene inevitably requires 
alternative spatial imaginaries beyond global, international, or national concerns 
as we currently understand them. This acknowledgement is not a preferential 
argument for one over potential others, but rather, it is an attempt to recognize 
a series of planetary responses that are situated, partial, untranslatable, 
oscillating, radical, rhizomatic, etc. 1  Further, such differing perspectives can 
challenge science as a historical production of Western knowledge and values and 
its consequent relation to environmental politics (Caluya 31; Larsen & Johnson 
192; Shiva 164; Vogler 13). 
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The Exclusionary Politics of the Nation-State 
Although the spatial imaginary of the Anthropocene appears global, reactions 
and policies remain for the most part discussed in terms and relations to the 
nation-state. This section looks at how the discussion of the nation-state and 
the spatial imaginary of the state is reproduced within discussions of 
anthropogenic climate change, particularly in the context of the 2016 U.S. 
election. I use this as an example to highlight the continued colonial imaginary 
of geographic space within the nation-state in exclusionary politics, as well as to 
indicate that a cosmopolitan spatial imaginary does not work in contrast to a 
historically imperial spatial imagination and politics; rather, it is a continuous 
thread. This section considers the nationalistic discourses that produce the 
environment as a security threat and the ways in which this also parallels 
exclusionary identity politics and immigration relations.  
         Of course, I do not mean to presume by my engagement with the nation-
state in environmental politics that it is the only agent involved. As John Vogler 
notes, other agents and factors include individuals, transnational actors and 
governments, inter-state politics, international institutions, or even a more 
general conceptualization of a global system (15). To focus on the nation-state, 
however, is to acknowledge that its privileged position in environmental politics 
is “invariably conditioned by a given ideologically structured conception of the 
environment” (Williams 43-44). This must also involve an interrogation of the 
presumptions of the state, including its objective and ahistorical discourses. 
         The recent 2016 U.S. presidential election indicated ongoing discursive 
power formations, such as the denial of global climate change. Many feared that, 
moving into 2017, president-elect Donald J. Trump would roll back or alter many 
of the policies and regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
(Malakof et. al 1364). Trump indicated that he would put leaders of the fossil fuel 
industries into key positions, and possibly leave international agreements. Of 
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course there was also Trump’s now-infamous tweet – not to mention numerous 
related tweets between 2013 and 2014 – that “[t]he concept of global warming 
was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-
competitive.” In yet another earlier tweet, Trump claims that “[t]he con artists 
changed the name from GLOBAL WARMING to CLIMATE CHANGE when GLOBAL 
WARMING was no longer working and credibility was lost!”2 Additionally, among 
these concerns were possible changes that the administration might make 
towards an economic measure known as the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), which 
attempts to quantify the economic price of carbon emissions, in future-oriented 
terms (Malakof et. al 1365). The goal is to provide a discount rate indicating how 
much could be spent now to avoid higher costs in the future, and the accruing 
damage that goes along with these discounts. Attached to the SCC, and most 
importantly for my concerns here, is a geographic component. During Barack 
Obama’s administration, the SCC had worked out to a rate between 2.5 per cent 
to 5 per cent, leaning towards the lower end of the range, and these numbers 
were based off global considerations as well as what would benefit the U.S. 
(Malakof et. al 1365).  That is to say, the scientific knowledge productions that 
surround the state policies of Obama’s administration considered simultaneously 
that which is in excess of the territory and policies of the nation-state. The 
concern with Trump’s administration was that the SCC would start operating on 
a higher rate, which would require less capital and regulations at first, but 
potentially incur a much higher cost later. 
         However, it is not only in the regulations around the SCC that we see 
instances of discursive formations emerging between nationalism and potential 
cosmopolitanisms; a similar geospatial dialectic was at work when President 
Trump announced his decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. The 
President announced on 1 June 2017:  
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[I]n order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and its citizens, the 
United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. […] As President, 
I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of American citizens. The 
Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into 
an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of 
other countries. (“Statement”; emphasis mine)  
Obviously, the rhetoric here is nationalistic and articulates an exclusionary us-
versus-them dynamic, where the American citizen must be protected from the 
bad deal of taking on the responsibility of the rest of the world. This follows 
precisely along the lines of Chantal Mouffe’s observations of the exclusionary 
politics necessary for Western liberalism: “In the West the meaning of democracy 
was founded on the differences established between its own system of 
governance and those of the ‘other’ that rejected it” (105). Mouffe proceeds to 
argue that “[t]he political cannot be grasped by liberal rationalism as it shows 
the limits of any rational consensus, and reveals that any consensus is based on 
acts of exclusion” (106). The point is that, although Trump’s policies clearly 
indicate extreme exclusionary and nationalistic politics, they are consistent with 
the politico-territorial production of the nation-state within Western liberalism. 
This coincidence does not get him off the hook, so to speak; rather, it indicates 
that more work must be done to reconceptualize potential responses and 
response-abilities to changing environments, landscapes, and natures (Haraway, 
Staying 16). For example, even in arguably better regulations, as indicated by the 
SCC numbers, scientific knowledge production around and about the climate goes 
unquestioned in its objectivity, and it’s also both limited and wielded by the 
nation-state in the stance of an external threat. The exclusionary politics of 
Trump’s speech on the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Climate Accord 
simultaneously produces economics, the environment, and the political Other as 
an external threat. To address these hostilities, I suggest that we look at all three 
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along Western historical lines of knowledge production and imaginaries, imperial 
histories, and their justifications. 
         The effects of environmental changes could arguably be traced back to the 
production of new technologies (e.g. the Industrial Revolution and our current 
production emissions) and the historico-economic relations that are intimately 
connected with them. For example, the Industrial Revolution is often equated as 
sign of progress and human ingenuity, but this appraisal downplays the extractive 
and imperial policies necessary for such “progress” to be made (Caluya 35). The 
deep connections between capital, material productions – in terms of both 
commodities and waste – and the environment are played out often in Trump’s 
speech, but here it is the priority of protecting the rights of American industries, 
such as coal, to thrive and to not be reined in by the impending rhetoric of climate 
change by the rest of the world. Once again, the President stresses, “The Paris 
Agreement handicaps the United States economy in order to win praise from the 
very foreign capitals and global activists that have long sought to gain wealth at 
our country’s expense. They don’t put America first. I do, and I always will … I 
was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris” (“Statement”). By 
emphasizing Pittsburgh over Paris, Trump directly reacts against a geospatial 
imaginary that is external to the state. However, this reactionary spatial 
imaginary does not seek to efface blame through acts of exclusion. Rather, it 
denies blame altogether. Further, it is also becoming increasingly difficult to roll 
back the spatial imaginary of either climate change or the global capitalist 
economy. Of the current  
U.S. environmental policies, John Bellamy Foster asks if this “monopoly-finance 
capitalism – with Donald Trump as its authentic representative – [is] 
contributing to this impending planetary catastrophe?” (1-2). And in raising this 
concern, Foster connects the spatial reach of the global capitalist system 
emerging as climate change itself: “The capital-accumulation system, however, 
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has now expanded its operations to encompass the entire planet, disrupting the 
biogeochemical processes of the Earth system itself, most dramatically in the 
form of climate change” (4). 
         To speak of contemporary spatial imaginaries is to also acknowledge the 
extension of capitalism into space, not only within pre-existing space, but also 
the spaces that are produced by capitalism. This observation by Henri Lefebvre 
follows his assertion that “new contradictions generated by the extension of 
capitalism to space have given rise to quickly popularized representations” (326). 
The ability to calculate the cost of climate change, not just as a metaphoric 
implication, but also as an actual quantity and the ongoing production of nature 
within capitalist representations, indicates moments when the Anthropocene also 
becomes the “Capitalocene” (Delanty & Mota 23; Haraway 47). Although Delanty 
and Mota, who reference the term, make a point to distinguish that not all of 
human activity can be explained by capitalism, I would suggest that it is 
important to consider how often such quantifications of capitalism arise within 
our current production of the Anthropocene (23). Conceptualizing the 
Capitalocene requires simultaneous historical representations and re-
productions of capital, the environment, and space, as well as an examination of 
how these relations have become hyper-politicized along postcolonial lines or in 
north-south global relations. Further, Delanty and Mota note the different time 
periods that have been marked as the originating point of the Anthropocene, such 
as Masline and Lewis’s “Orbis thesis,” which names the year 1610 as the starting 
point, and the changes in population, species, foodstuffs, and deforestation 
during Western Imperialism in the Americas (14). Gilbert Caluya also notes the 
Industrial Revolution as another origin marker of the Anthropocene. However, I 
suggest that it would be more accurately labelled as the “Eurocene or Anglocene” 
(35). While I’m less interested in when the Anthropocene began, I find these 
examples helpful as they highlight the continued historical implications of 
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Western imperialism and its notions of progress, and they are also directly tied 
to their consequent historic economic and environmental exploitation. 
         The triad of the environment, capitalism, and national identity is of high 
importance in discussions concerning many small island nations where rising sea 
levels are threatening their futures. Our inability to discuss environmental politics 
outside of the nation-state extends to our inadequacies of relating to individuals 
who will find themselves between states because of changing environments, 
landscapes, and waterscapes. The plight of these individuals indicates the need 
for alternative geographies – that is to say, alternative identifying spaces – 
leading Carol Farbotko, Elaine Stratford, and Heather Lazrus to conceptualize 
“geographic identity as performative,” particularly in the anticipation of a climate 
crisis, and to reflect “on whether there is a collective embrace or rejection of the 
idea of mobility in performances of identity among island peoples facing various 
scenarios of migration” (547). It’s not only the formation and organization of the 
world into nation-states that produce the stateless, as Chakrabarty observes, but 
the forces of globalization and changes in environments and climates also 
produce such a possibility (7). If we consider briefly that the promise of 
cosmopolitanism is to move beyond the formation of the nation-state, then we 
might posit that there is no cosmopolitan home for the truly cosmopolitan, as 
the climate change migrant and other refugees are not seen as beyond the 
nation-state but liminal, and even precarious. Thus the Western historical 
imaginary of cosmopolitanism begins to reveal itself. Geopolitical formations of 
the nation-state and the cosmopolitan spatial imaginary of the Anthropocene 
oscillate back and forth in responses and reactions to imagined internal and 
external threats. Amidst questions of blame, exclusionary politics, and forced 
migration, as well as many other concerns, the moral dilemma of changing 
geographies and spatial imaginaries also becomes apparent. 
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     As issues of migration and displacement by changing climates continue to 
challenge cosmopolitanism and the questions of a nation’s hospitality, an 
inimical cosmos-politics will only continue to develop, as has been seen in the 
response to Syrian refugees, the nationalistic concerns leading up to the Brexit 
vote, and the populist bellowing of Trump’s American-Mexican border wall 
during the 2016 U.S. election (Haidt 46; Wodak & Krzyżanowski). Foster also 
makes the argument that “Trump’s promise to ‘build a wall, along the border 
with Mexico to block ‘illegal immigration’ can be read at least in part as a reaction 
to climate change, even as the latter is being denied—just as sea walls are 
hypocritically being proposed by climate deniers in parts of the South as a means 
to protect coastal real estate” (11). Mouffe makes the point that, in the 
exclusionary politics of Western liberalism where there is an absence of an 
obvious external threat from which to base national identity, the focus turns to 
increased nationalist and populist politics in the face of the internal enemy, as 
represented by the immigrant (105). The immigrant, the foreigner, the stranger 
threatens national identity and sovereignty. But as these exclusionary politics 
parallel and interweave with understandings of environmental politics, the threat 
is simultaneously internal and external to the state. Derrida’s critique of 
cosmopolitanism is that it invokes a universal hospitality without limits, but the 
law of hospitality – in its notion of going beyond – can only be invoked by a 
simultaneous declaration of or by the state, limited by legislation. Therefore, 
cosmopolitanism’s hospitality, which already oscillates between host and 
hostility, is always in danger of being “perverted at any moment” (Derrida 23).   
         In addition to the environment being perceived as an internal and external 
threat to national security, it also becomes a concern of geopolitics (see Williams 
44). This allows for Dalby to discuss the global war on terror along similar lines 
as the Anthropocene, because the political and economic importance placed on 
oil has led to the inscription of environmental discourse within imperial and 
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colonial modes of thought, rendering the environment as both a resource and an 
external threat (111, 113; see also Caluya 36). Further, the conceptualization of 
the environment as both an extractable and commodifiable resource, as well as 
a potential threat to national security, only indicates a continuing imperial 
geographic logic that ensures the primacy of the nation-state within the 
discussion of environmental politics. Additionally, the environment that the state 
protects is also a historically specific imagined environment. For example, Caluya 
observes that settler colonial states are rarely concerned with readapting the 
environment to where it was before colonization; instead, they are only interested 
in maintaining the status quo after colonial violence, including the presence of 
non-native agricultural species. Caluya writes that this indicates that “invasive 
biology rhetoric often takes for granted the ‘naturalness’ of human colonization, 
even as it claims to be concerned about the ‘unnaturalness’ of non-human 
colonization” (36). The exclusionary mechanisms of the nation-state also 
collapse or erase the historical contingencies of many settler colonial states, 
particularly the fact that the human in these instances is the invasive species. 
Moreover, the rhetoric of invasion not only applies to discussions of the 
environment and the species that inhabit within it, but it is also employed often 
within racially charged discourses around immigration. Perhaps, then, it should 
be no surprise that the focus in the U.S. during the 2016 presidential election was 
the nation as a site of exclusionary politics in terms of more than just the 
environment. It is the geospatial imaginary of the nation-state as the site of 
potential resistance against a cosmopolitan imaginary that allows for such 
politics to emerge within contemporary discourses. 
         In discussions of the environment as a threat to the state, both the 
geospatial imaginaries of the nation-state and the Anthropocene emerge, at once 
reinforcing the boundaries of the state and that which is beyond it. Both of these 
discourses are not produced separately but simultaneously within the globalized 
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threat of environmental crises. Here, environmental crises are synonymous with 
state crises. Perhaps it should be argued, then, that a cosmopolitan geospatial 
imaginary is necessary in order to move beyond exclusionary and even imperial 
geospatial imaginary of the nation-state, because it’s a geographical production 
of scale and social coexistence that can adequately tackle the scale of 
environmental crises and their attendant threat to humanity.  
In the following section, I will argue, first, that the Anthropocene already 
works within a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary, and any suggestion for 
cosmopolitanism as an ethical reaction to the Anthropocene already fails within 
its own logic system. Seen in this context, they are tautological. Second, because 
the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene is not in opposition 
to the nation-state, but follows similar Western imperial and colonial geopolitical 
and temporal understandings, what is ultimately needed is a decolonization of 
the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene. 
The Collapsing Politics of a Cosmopolitan Anthropocene 
Jose M. Alcaraz, Katherine Sugars, Katerina Nicolopoulou, and Francisco Tirado 
have recently suggested that as “[i]nitially developed in the natural sciences 
(Earth-systems sciences, resilience theory, social-ecological systems), the 
Anthropocene offers powerful new insights to think about the-planet-as-the-
“cosmos”-of-cosmopolitanism” (315). They also contend that taking a 
cosmopolitan perspective towards the Anthropocene may elicit a more ethnically 
and socially responsible approach towards global climate change when we 
consider the “distant other.”3 Towards these ends, they align their work with 
Tariq Jazeel’s 2011 article, “Spatializing difference beyond cosmopolitanism,” on 
which they draw to contend that cosmopolitanism should be considered 
geographically (Alcaraz et. al 315). But what gets left out of such a framing is 
that, while Jazeel does argue that cosmopolitanism should be thought of in 
geographic terms, he is primarily concerned with what a geospatial perspective 
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of cosmopolitanism enables us to do. For Jazeel, this is to demystify “the view 
from nowhere” from which cosmopolitanism views the world, and “thinking 
spatially about cosmopolitanism is precisely what offers the capacity to prize 
apart some of the concept’s unthinking Eurocentrism” (77). That is, while 
aligning their argument for a cosmopolitan response to the Anthropocene with 
Jazeel, Alcaraz and others actually miss his main argument, which is that thinking 
of cosmopolitanism geographically allows it to be critiqued as a universalizing 
Western imaginary that collapses difference. This concern of cosmopolitanism 
does not neatly resolve itself when placed within the context of the 
Anthropocene, but hides the ways which humanity continues to be universalized 
and collapsed within the use of environmental politics. Such a perspective also 
fails to see the ways in which the Anthropocene is already cosmopolitan, what 
Gerard Delanty and Aurea Mota have referenced as the “Cosmopolocene” (11). 
The Anthropocene, Capitalocene, and Cosmopolocene emerge simultaneously 
within a historical, Western geospatial imaginary. Elizabeth Johnson and Harlan 
Morehouse contend that a geographic consideration of the Anthropocene allows 
us to  
explore the relationship between biopolitics and the emerging ‘geopolitics’ of 
our new epoch; the patterns of inequality and difference emergent as part of 
the Anthropocene’s universalizing ‘anthro’; the limits of political subjectivity, 
agency, and technological managerialism; and innovative methods for socio-
ecological practice. (440-441) 
By stressing the geographic, any notion of a Cosmopolocene must be done by 
also acknowledging the performativity of historical power relations, even in this 
future-oriented condition. The Anthropocene is produced within a cosmopolitan 
geospatial imaginary as they both follow what Denis Cosgrove refers to as the 
Apollonian gaze, a “gaze, which pulls diverse life on earth into a vision of unity, 
is individualized, a divine and mastering view from a single perspective” (xi; qtd. 
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in Jazeel 80). This view from nowhere served historically through imperial and 
colonial cartographic practices, and continues in our current view of 
“globalization.” It is not a politically neutral concept (Delanty & Mota 24). 
         Timothy Luke has written that “[r]apid global climate change is a set of 
real geophysical and biochemical realities. Yet, it also is now a rich political 
imaginary pulling together complex clusters of signs, symbols, and stories” (“The 
Climate” 280). The Anthropocene is one of many possible stories and geographies 
with which we might imagine a response-ability to one another but also one that 
should be historically contextualized within its cosmopolitan geospatial 
imaginary, producing a collapsed and collective “all of us” in a singular, political 
space referred to as “the environment.” But the Anthropocene is also a potentially 
problematic “tool, story, or epoch to think with,” particularly when the objectivity 
within its scientific knowledge production is left unquestioned (Haraway, Staying 
49). To place and collapse all of humanity as a universal subject within 
geographic imaginary of the Anthropocene is a colonizing move in itself.  
         Both cosmopolitanism and the Anthropocene work only by a willing 
transcendence to a global, geotechnical planet. For example, Luke observes that, 
in part, studies on the Anthropocene are produced as “various networks of 
scientific and technical experts once again position themselves to administer 
from above and afar any collective efforts to mitigate or adapt to rapid 
anthropogenic climate change” (“On” 141; emphasis mine). This political 
distancing by scientific and technical experts not only signals the space necessary 
to produce objective knowledge but also parallels Jazeel's critique of the 
geospatial imaginary of cosmopolitanism. It is exactly this geotechnical eye that 
collapses and transcends what Haraway has referred to as a “god trick,” that is, 
“[v]ision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all seems not 
just mythically about the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to 
have put myth into ordinary practice. And like the god trick, this eye fucks the 
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world to make techno-monsters” (“Situated” 581). The view “is the achievement 
of an imperial effort to design universality; an effort whose idiom is entirely 
continuous through the fashioning of a self-confident European, and 
Enlightenment, ‘planetary consciousness’” (Jazeel 82). A techno-planetary view 
allows us to see that a solution is possible, that all we need is a scientific 
achievement. Through continued echoes of Western Enlightenment the planet is 
placed on a teleological, technical horizon, “an omnipolis ready to be 
geoengineered” (Luke, “On” 162). Instead, as Haraway suggests, response-ability 
may also require, at times, acknowledging that we might not all make it; instead, 
the goal “is to make kin in lines of inventive connection as a practice of learning 
to live and die well with each other in a thick present. Our task is to make trouble, 
to stir up potent responses to devastating events, as well as to settle troubled 
waters and rebuild quiet places” (Staying 1). 
         Climate change has always been about inequalities (Roberts & Parks 194).4 
These inequalities, as can be expected, not only follow the imagined and 
produced geographic formations of the global north and south but also furthers 
their divisions. That is,  
[t]hese compounding inequalities overlay an already polarized North–South 
debate and enmesh rich and poor countries in an adversarial negotiating 
environment. As such, it has become exceedingly difficult to broker a mutually 
acceptable international agreement that would stabilize the climate. (Roberts 
and Parks 194)  
Not only does the discussion of climate change in terms of the Anthropocene 
collapse these differences, blame, and inequalities, it also masks the problem of 
economic production, focusing instead on the issues of geological formations. 
         This “unreal universality of the Anthropocene hides the profane practices 
of degraded capitalist individuality in the detritus left by the machinic means of 
personal lives defined by the alien powers of commodification. These new 
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Anthropocenic chronicles also estrange Man from nature, himself, and species-
being” (Luke, “On” 146). The view from nowhere is all too objective and at the 
same time is all too human. It is made subjectively-objective by the position of 
looking at the earth from above; the imagined human eye on the world, and what 
that eye sees, is not its own humanity but its own collapsed erasure. It is precisely 
the collapse of the human that allows it to re-emerge as a universal oneness, a 
whole unified humanity. But as Luke indicates, this subject as humanity is not all 
“men” but, rather, a select few. A cosmopolitan imaginary allows us to imagine 
all humanity, but only as it is “ours” – that is to say, a historically Western 
narrative of humanity. 
         Marc Williams notes that environmental concerns were not of great 
importance to international relations scholars before the 1980s (42). Indeed, as 
“[a]ccelerated environmental degradation raises crucial questions concerning 
humanity’s relationship with the natural world, and with other species,” 
international relations theory attempted to view environmental concerns as a 
global problem (42). However, such a move only continued to reproduce the 
silences and erasures in the mapping of global environmental crises within the 
objective, scientific production of Western knowledge, since it also 
simultaneously “removed from critical view the ways in which, historically, 
environmental issues had been silenced” (Williams 43). The decolonization of the 
Anthropocene and international relations also gestures towards a decolonization 
of the field from which these imperial and colonial articulations of power is 
studied. 
         As noted earlier in the paper, Chakrabarty points out a contradictory 
understanding of the human within the Anthropocene. First, the human is held 
responsible, as both purposeful and agentic, for the changes in their 
environments. Second, likened to a geophysical force, humans are, in turn, 
likened to the nonhuman and, by extension, invested with nonhuman agency. He 
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suggests that in discussion of the anthropogenic climate change and global 
warming, one has to think of these things simultaneously: “the human-human 
and the nonhuman-human” (11). As a collective agency, it is neither subject nor 
object but “pure, nonontological agency” (13). Paralleling once more Jazeel’s 
arguments, there is no corresponding human agency, as humanity gets 
universalized, with differences re-routed or collapsed, and becomes apolitical in 
the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene. This “collective 
mode of existence,” as a universal humanity affecting change and as a 
geophysical force, is also “justice-blind” (Chakrabarty 14). Inequalities persist, 
but they also may be required.  
         Chakrabarty suggests that simultaneous contradictory registers are needed 
in order to address this human and non-human relation and that we need a way 
of conceptualizing the human beyond where postcolonial thought has advanced 
it, “as a geophysical force and as a political bearer of rights and as author of 
actions; subject to both forces of nature (being itself one such force collectively) 
the contingency of individual human experience; belonging to differently-scaled 
histories of the planet, of life and human societies” (14). But if any mode of 
conceptual and theoretical thought has taught us about finding value and lenses 
in the contradictory and liminal spaces of identity, it is the postcolonial, but now 
decolonization may be required. A decolonization of the Anthropocene is not just 
an ethical stance to account for the silences and erasures of our current climate 
politics, particularly seen in discourses specific to the nation-state, but it is also 
ethical in terms of the potential survival of the human and nonhuman-human, 
even as these relations oscillate between wild excesses and differences beyond 
the scope of precise definitions and diagnosis. 
         Engaging with the non-human, for many people around the world, also 
involves moving beyond just dualistic notions of nature and extends, for example, 
to the notions of spirits and the sacred. Mabel Denzin Gergan points out that, 
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although the agency in gods, spirits, and deities is less explored when it comes 
to environmental concerns, such entities might open up discussions of indigenous 
knowledge about local geographies and could be helpful to our current 
understandings of nature, in that such knowledge works toward the 
decolonization of the Anthropocene through acknowledgement of the excess, and 
radical plurality, of lifeworlds and environments. Indeed, religious and spiritual 
beliefs can offer alternative ways to understand and cope with environmental 
changes and crises, as well as establish different relationships to non-human 
agency (Gergan 263). Furthermore, pending Chakrabarty’s suggestion that a 
postcolonial approach provides a way to handle and hold up simultaneous 
diffractions and contractions of the human and non-human within a potential 
ecological crisis, engaging notions of the sacred or divine within nature continues 
to blur the lines between the human and non-human, culture and nature.  
         Dalby poses a question similar to what I am asking here: “[h]ow then might 
we think differently about the global ordering of politics in the Anthropocene?” 
(113). What he suggests is echoed by many indigenous scholars, which is to 
reconceptualize place, geographies, and ourselves; environments and places can 
no longer be seen as external from the human but are both a part of the human 
experience and also more-than-human (Dalby 116; Larsen & Johnson). Soren C. 
Larsen and Jay T. Johnson make the explicit argument for place in the discussion 
of environmental concerns, particularly in localities where we can learn from 
native and indigenous peoples. Place is multiple, plural, and rhizomatic; “Place is 
not just a sited forced engagement, but is actively initiating and sustaining 
coexistence struggle in lands that have been exploited and degraded but that are 
still claimed by the Indigenous peoples who assert their belonging, guardianship, 
and sovereignty” (Larsen & Johnson 1-2). Although here it is important to 
determine exactly who and what is meant by sovereign. In order to address the 
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many different scales in all of their messy entanglements, Larsen and Johnson 
examine the positionalities and cosmopolitics of co-existence:   
Cosmos here refers not to an ordered whole but to the agonism of worlds in 
place. Comprehension of the whole is precluded not only because our own 
worldviews are partial and situated, but because the whole does not exist as a 
static object that can be comprehended as such – our co-becoming is 
embodied, fluid, and dynamic, a worlding. (5) 
Haraway also holds out for a response-able cosmopolitanism, and suggests that, 
perhaps, “[t]elling stories together with historically situated critters is fraught 
with the risks and joys of composing a more livable cosmopolitics” (Staying 15). 
         However, referencing Jazeel’s argument, the “cosmos” of cosmopolitanism 
and cosmopolitics cannot escape its own Western conceptual shadow no matter 
how many times it’s deconstructed or pluralized. Moreover, we might ask, why 
do we need cosmopolitanism here? Is there not a way to imagine one another in 
differing places and scales without continually being tied to cosmopolitanism? 
Yet, if I follow Jazeel’s lead, it is possible to move out of this conceptual shadow 
by thinking of cosmopolitanism, again, on geographic terms. As much as 
cosmopolitanism holds promises of plurality it is still a holistic geographical 
conception, which can be used too easily as a universalizing tool. Additionally, 
engaging cosmopolitanism within plural understandings does not erase the 
historical geospatial baggage or its contemporary manifestation in the 
declaration of the Anthropocene. Since the Anthropocene is derived from 
Enlightenment logic, and threatens to co-opt that version of humanity, 
postcolonial and indigenous concerns must be taken seriously in criticism of the 
Anthropocene, as it “does not sit comfortably within Indigenous ways of thinking, 
in large part because it derives from a Western time-based ontology that is at 
odds with the place-based ontologies of Indigenous peoples” (Larsen & Johnson 
31, 192).   
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         Larsen and Johnson note that the Anthropocene is proof of humanity’s 
quest to master the Earth, but I argue that it is the production of the 
Anthropocene itself, a conceptualization of a universal humanity as a geophysical 
force through an objective and scientific lens that views the world in 
transcendental heights that also proves humanity’s quest to master blame (197). 
This is a critique beyond just the effects of the Anthropocene, but a critique of it 
as the tool to measure the effects of changing climates. The Anthropocene as a 
concept follows the continued supremacy of sky gods, whether we shall name 
them Apollo, Progress, or Modernity (Haraway Staying 57). Additionally, the scale 
of the Anthropocene erases the many apocalyptic experiences that indigenous, 
native, colonial, and “developing” populations have already experienced under 
imperialism and colonialism. These are more than historical encounters; they 
stem from the devastating impacts of contemporary government policies and 
actions that have destroyed homes, cultures, landscapes, and ways of living. The 
nation-state once again becomes a place and temporality of struggle, even in the 
face of a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary. The Anthropocene embraces all of 
humanity only when the global north is also facing an apocalypse.      
         Therefore, instead of a cosmopolitics of co-existence, what about a 
performative multi-existence – and not just between place and humans, the 
human and non-human – that constitutes a radical expression of our entangled 
togetherness? These entanglements are exactly what Haraway would have us 
embrace to the point of composting – making odd kin with a tentacular ethnics 
of the present that does not look to Edenic pasts or apocalyptic futures –  “in 
unexpected collaborations and combinations, hot compost piles” (Staying 4). 
Performative entanglements are always localized – they can be written, oral, 
place-specific, poetic, narrative, and scholarly – and it shifts in its productions 
as it produces. This is not meant to transcend localized or placed-based 
Decolonizing the Cosmopolitan Geospatial Imaginary of the Anthropocene Pivot 7.1 
  	163 
knowledges but to recognize the complexities from which these knowledges 
come and the ways in which they manifest themselves. 
         Co-existence implies a potentially (ideal) beneficial relationship between 
the human and non-human, but it is not only humans who have had drastic 
effects on environments. Environments also make changes to humans, which 
include health concerns such as diseases, pathogens, bacteria, and other elements 
that are detrimental to humans – all of these things indicate the messy 
entanglements between humans and their environments (Shaw 519). Caluya also 
looks at invasive diseases being treated with the same exclusionary state politics 
as terrorism, which implies, once again, how geopolitics and the geospatial 
imaginaries of the nation-state intersect to justify state control over the 
perceived external threat, suggesting that “‘invasion’ rhetoric naturalizes the 
security logics of managing non-Western populations with reference to disease 
control” (36). But perhaps here I can use the container-based metaphor of the 
nation-state to reach an alternative understanding of the opposing binary of the 
human and non-human: as both changing air and bacteria enters our bodies, are 
they really separate from us? Even as scholars engage with notions of the human 
and non-human in all of their messiness, it seems there is still a desire to 
distinguish these things. Perhaps considering the relationship more 
rhizomatically would help as well. We have never been individuals, but always 
sympoiesis, or “making-with” one element or another (Haraway, Trouble 67; 58). 
“Sympoiesis” is also meant to convey “complex, dynamic, responsive, situated, 
historical systems. It is a word for wording-with, in company” (Haraway, Trouble 
58). The human body is always renegotiated and remembered in these instances. 
Work is done to carve it back out of its rhizomatic and performative existences. 
And perhaps, then, reconceptualizing the Anthropocene is really a decolonization 
of the self in space. 
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Endnotes
1 The overview of planetary responses is inspired from discussions by Donna Haraway, Vandana Shiva, 
Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari. 
2 Tweets were also located at, http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com 
3 Alcatraz et. al ’s discussion of the ‘distant other’ they contribute to Chatterjee, D. (2004), The Ethics of 
Assistance, Morality and the Distant Needy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 
337-355. and Dobson, A. (2003), Citizenship and the Environment, Oxford University Press, New York, 
NY. 
4 Roberts and Parks also reference their work here: Roberts, J. T. & Parks, B. C. (2007) A Climate of 
Injustice: Global Inequality, North–South Politics, and Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Their 
call here for a “hybrid” solution acknowledges the various other agreements and positions that have been 
enacted or proposed for dealing with the inequalities of climate change, including “grandfathering” (the 
1997, Kyoto Protocol is an example of this), carbon intensity (with an emphasis on economic grown with 
low carbon emissions); a global per capita norm (where those countries whose consumption of fossil fuels 
was well below the average would be allowed room/ time to develop and emit), and proposals for historic 
responsibility (which obviously effect many in the global north, specifically Britain and the United States) 
(199). 
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